Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law

LARC @ Cardozo Law
Cardozo Law Review de•novo

Scholarship

2019

Reality Check: The Need to Repair the Broken System of
Delegating Legislative Power Under the National Emergencies Act
Michael J. Pastrick
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/de-novo
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pastrick, Michael J., "Reality Check: The Need to Repair the Broken System of Delegating Legislative
Power Under the National Emergencies Act" (2019). Cardozo Law Review de•novo. 65.
https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/de-novo/65

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cardozo Law Review de•novo by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For
more information, please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu.

de•novo

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

REALITY CHECK: THE NEED TO REPAIR THE
BROKEN SYSTEM OF DELEGATING LEGISLATIVE
POWER UNDER THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT
Michael J. Pastrick, Esq.†

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 21
I.

SOURCES OF EXECUTIVE POWER ..................................................................... 23
A. Constitutional Executive Power ........................................................... 23
B. Statutory Executive Power ................................................................... 28

II. THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES .................................................... 31
III. THE REPAIR ..................................................................................................... 33
A. The Practical Solution ......................................................................... 34
1. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) ................................................................... 34
2. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b)................................................................... 36
3. 50 U.S.C. § 1601 ....................................................................... 37
B. The Practical Problem with the Practical Solution ............................. 38
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 40

† The author has dedicated his legal career to serving justice as counsel to judges of New York
State appellate courts. He is also an adjunct professor of law at the University at Buffalo Law
School. The author thanks Zachary Silver for his helpful comments, suggestions, guidance, and
patience in the preparation and shaping of this article.

20

2019]

REPAIRING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT

21

INTRODUCTION
John Lennon, Paul McCartney, and Steve Jobs have shaped our
present-day political discourse in ways that they almost certainly could
not have imagined. America met Lennon, McCartney, and the “other”
members of the Beatles through their 1964 appearance on the Ed Sullivan
Show—a performance that was viewed by approximately 73 million
people1 and that helped legitimize television as an effective means of
mass communication.
Steve Jobs introduced America to another transformative means of
communication in 2007 through the debut of the iPhone.2 Originally
intended as an iPod capable of making telephone calls,3 the iPhone
brought the Internet to the tips of a user’s thumbs. In doing so, it provided
a nearly ubiquitous means of instant mass communication to hundreds of
millions of consumers.4
Television helped convert the United States into a sound-bite
society. Ideas, including those in the political space, are now
communicated through short, catchy speech designed to represent much
broader thoughts or positions.5 Some have even argued that Donald
Trump’s presidency is a byproduct of his fourteen-year stint as star of The
Apprentice and The Celebrity Apprentice reality television shows. That
exposure, in the words of one commentator, “presented Trump as a calm,
infallible decision-maker, who listened to others but came to his own
conclusions, [and] greatly emphasized his success” to a significant
national audience.6
As society further adopted devices like the iPhone, attention spans
dwindled,7 and communication in short bursts became even more
prevalent. Applications like Facebook and Twitter made rapid, cursory

1 America Meets the Beatles on the Ed Sullivan Show, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/
this-day-in-history/america-meets-the-beatles-on-the-ed-sullivan-show [https://perma.cc/5BJBHBNX] (last updated Dec. 13, 2018).
2 Cal Newport, Steve Jobs Never Wanted Us to Use our iPhones Like This, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/opinion/sunday/steve-jobs-never-wanted-us-touse-our-iphones-like-this.html [https://perma.cc/G3DE-SFXH].
3 Id.
4 Global Apple iPhone Sales from 3rd Quarter 2007 to 4th Quarter 2018, STATISTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/263401/global-apple-iphone-sales-since-3rd-quarter-2007
[https://
perma.cc/MSH6-MHEW] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
5 Given President Trump’s gift of spectacle and flair, perhaps television is more responsible
for his presidency than for any other to which it may have contributed.
6 Bert Gambini, Realty TV Played Key Role in Taking Trump from ‘Apprentice’ to President,
UBNOW (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.buffalo.edu/ubnow/stories/2018/03/gabriel-trump-realitytv.html [https://perma.cc/H66G-8SRD] (considering the research of psychologist Shira Gabriel).
7 Kevin McSpadden, You Now Have a Shorter Attention Span Than a Goldfish, TIME (May
14, 2015), http://time.com/3858309/attention-spans-goldfish [https://perma.cc/J5RX-GEVT].
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interactions common—so much so that some of the most important
discourse is now conducted in 280-character increments.8 News is made
and consumed in bursts, and political conversation frequently is driven
not by depth of dialogue, but by a simplified message compressed for
easy consumption.
Hotly debated on those new mediums is the legality of President
Trump’s effort to fund a border wall9 dividing the United States from
Mexico through unilateral emergency action.10 But no matter the result
of that controversy—a dispute on which this Article takes no position—
there remains a more difficult question driven not by sound bites and new
media, but by ancient parchment and principles articulated centuries ago.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that President Trump lacks
constitutional authority to unilaterally order the construction of the Wall,
the issue becomes whether Congress has delegated its constitutional
authority to the executive branch to independently commission
construction of that barrier. No matter how that question is answered—
again, this Article does not wade into that controversy— the present
debate demands that the process by which legislative power is delegated
to the executive branch by virtue of an emergency declaration quickly be
revisited.
When it was enacted in 1976, the measure by which Congress
delegated emergency legislative authority to the executive branch—the
National Emergencies Act11—allowed Congress to revoke an emergency

8 Hayley Tsukayama, Twitter is Officially Doubling the Character Limit to 280, WASH. POST
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/07/twitter-isofficially-doubling-the-character-limit-to-280 [https://perma.cc/PC2F-BQQA].
9 I will generally refer to the border wall simply as “the Wall.” References to the Wall will
also pertain to a sea-to-sea structure. The 2016 Republican National Committee Platform demanded
a wall running the entire length of the southern border, from San Diego to Brownsville, Texas. See
Republican Platform 2016, at 25–26, REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/
media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WCV3XZMB]. Although his 2019 request to fund such a barrier sought monies at this point in time for
“only” a 234-mile stretch of that project at unspecified locations on the border, see Letter from
Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir., Exec. Office of the President, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to
Richard Shelby, Chairman, Comm. on Appropriations, U.S. Senate 1 (Jan. 6, 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Final-Shelby-1-6-19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
ZL7X-YWEJ], President Trump has not categorically retreated from the idea that, whenever it is
completed, the wall must cover every inch of the southern border, see Republican Platform 2016,
supra, at 26; cf. Christal Hayes, ‘Not a 2,000-Mile Concrete Structure from Sea to Sea’: Is Trump
Scaling Back Border Wall Plan?, USA TODAY (Jan. 20, 2019, 7:23 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/01/19/trump-wall-wont-2-000-mile-concretestructure-sea-sea/2627378002 [https://perma.cc/4WHF-GZQL].
10 Toluse Olorunnipa & Erik Wasson, Trump Says He Can Declare National Emergency to
Build Wall, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2019, 9:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-01-04/trump-says-he-can-declare-national-emergency-to-build-wall.
11 See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2012)).
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declaration by simple majority vote.12 A few years later, however, the
Supreme Court’s decision in I.N.S. v. Chadha13 held this mechanism to
be unconstitutional, thus allowing the President to veto a congressional
revocation of an emergency declaration.14 To simply retain its own
legislative authority, Congress suddenly was required to muster the
support of two-thirds of the members of each chamber to override that
executive declination.
Part I of this Article will explore the constitutional and statutory
sources of executive power, respectively, before detailing in Part II the
unintended consequences of Congress’s delegation of legislative power
to the executive branch through the National Emergencies Act. Part III
will propose a practical, simple, and sturdy repair to the National
Emergencies Act that will limit the potential for the abuses warned of by
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson decades ago. Instead of providing
a grant of emergency legislative authority to the executive branch that
may only be revoked by legislative action, Congress should revise the law
to provide a finite grant of legislative authority to the executive branch
that may only be extended through legislative approval of an executive
emergency declaration within a short period of time after that declaration
is made.
I. SOURCES OF EXECUTIVE POWER
A.

Constitutional Executive Power

Our review naturally and logically begins with a discussion of the
breadth of executive power under the Constitution. In basic terms, a
constitution is “[t]he fundamental and organic law of a country or state
that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the
scope of governmental . . . powers, and guarantees individual civil rights
and civil liberties.”15 Said more simply, a constitution can be thought of
as a bedrock or a foundation for government. By its own intelligent
design, the federal Constitution may not be easily changed; the core rules
of government are intended to evolve slowly and carefully, if at all, to
provide stability to society.16

12 See id. § 202(a)(1), 90 Stat. at 1255 (“Any national emergency declared by the President in
accordance with this title shall terminate if Congress terminates the emergency by concurrent
resolution . . . .”).
13 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
14 See id. at 952–59.
15 Constitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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This is not, however, to say that the Constitution is not sometimes
subject to interpretation. For decades, if not for centuries, there have been
disputes about the meaning and extent of such things as constitutional
protections for the freedom of speech, for the bearing of arms, from
illegal search and seizure, and for the due process of law. One obvious
way to resolve many such disputes is to look at the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution.
Perhaps the most significant influence over those who built—or
framed—the Constitution was exerted by seventeenth-century English
philosopher John Locke, who articulated his views of the power and
extent of government in his Two Treatises on Government. According to
Locke, the bond of a government to its people is “conjugal” in a sense
similar to the relationship “between man and woman.”17 “Conjugal
society,” in Locke’s words, “is made by a voluntary compact between
man and woman,”18 and is accomplished, in spite of the
“sometimes . . . different wills” of “husband and wife,”19 to support the
“common concern” of the “continuation of the species.”20
Similar to that interpersonal relationship, thought Locke, was the
interaction of a government and its people. To bridge the inevitable
differences in will and understanding of the critical mass of people who
sought to unite into a single society required both the rule and the balance
of law21 in what Locke aptly referred to as a “commonwealth”22; that is,
a sharing of wealth for the benefit of all. The “great end of . . . entering
into society”—namely, the “enjoyment of [one’s] properties in peace and
safety”—were accomplished through “the laws established in that
society.”23
Perhaps it is to that phrase that we owe modern references to the
United States as a nation of laws and as a society founded upon the rule
of law.24 Perhaps it was, however, that Locke instilled in the Framers of

17 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
133 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 135.
20 Id. at 133.
21 Id. at 137–38.
22 Id. at 157–58.
23 Id. at 158.
24 History attributes to John Adams the famous saying that we are “a government of laws, not
of men.” See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS & JONATHAN SEWELL, NOVANGLUS AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS,
OR POLITICAL ESSAYS PUBLISHED IN THE YEARS 1774 AND 1775 ON THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND HER COLONIES 84 (1819); MASS. CONST. art.
XXX, pt. 1. The origin of that point is not as important as its substance. Our society “depend[s]
upon compliance with the rule of law to bring order from chaos,” to provide “consistency of result
for all persons,” and to afford “predictability in the result of the manner in which we conduct our
daily affairs.” Weaver v. Credigy Receivables, Inc., No. 10-04-00331-CV, 2005 WL 23681, at *2
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our republic the concept that power is the “right to direct how the force
of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community
and the members of it.”25 And perhaps it also was Locke’s concern with
respect to the concentration of authority in the hands of the few, and his
belief that “legislative and executive power . . . be separated,”26 that
motivated the Framers of the Constitution to avoid consolidating power
in a single entity:
[B]ecause it may be too great temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp
at power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws to
have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may
exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the
law, both in its making and execution, to their own private
advantage . . . .27

The Framers, of course, took a similar approach in splitting power
between three co-equal branches of government, spelling out the
respective roles and powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches in the first three articles of the Constitution, respectively.28 The
reference to the legislative branch first in that compact suggests that the
Framers, although not necessarily in lockstep with the view of the
legislature as “[t]he supreme power of the commonwealth,”29 saw that
branch as essential and co-equal with the executive and judicial arms of
the sovereign.30
In that vein, the Framers placed control of critical, if not momentous,
decisions for such things as the power to declare war with Congress.31
The power to raise and support armed and naval forces rests solely with
Congress,32 as does the responsibility to “make all Laws.” 33 All bills for
raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives34—the
part of Congress to which the populace is most closely connected.35 More
importantly, the Framers explicitly vested Congress with the “power of

(Tex. App. Jan. 5, 2005) (Gray, C.J., dissenting). “As a nation of laws, the whims of those in power
are supposed to yield to the application of the rules.” Id.
25 LOCKE, supra note 17, at 164.
26 Id.
27 Id. Locke believed that to permit the usurpation of power would be to promote “tyranny,”
which he defined as “the exercise of power beyond right.” Id. at 188.
28 See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
29 See generally LOCKE, supra note 17, at 158.
30 But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 350 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“[I]n
republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.”).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
32 Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–13.
33 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
34 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
35 See id. art. I, § 2.

26

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

[2019

the purse,” commanding that “No Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”36
With the executive branch, the Framers placed different and fewer
responsibilities. Consistent with Locke’s theories,37 the Framers vested
in the presidency leadership of the armed forces,38 pardon power,39
appointment power,40 and the responsibility to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.”41
What arguably is that bare articulation of executive power has given
rise to differences of opinion as to the strength and authority of the
executive branch. The discordant theories of two Presidents from the
early twentieth century illustrate this point well.
On the one hand, Theodore Roosevelt saw the presidency as an
office of inherent power, limited only by the constraints placed upon it
by the Constitution. According to Roosevelt, “every executive
officer . . . [is] a steward of the people,” meaning that “what [is]
imperative [and] necessary for the Nation [should] be done by the
President” as a matter of duty, absent constitutional or legislative
prohibition.42
On the other hand, Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft, had
a more constrained and arguably conservative view of executive power.
Unlike Roosevelt, who believed the Constitution’s discussion of the
executive branch provided for expansive presidential power, Taft saw the
Framers’ articulation of executive authority as limited and limiting. That
is, Taft viewed executive power as something derived from the
Constitution and only from the Constitution. In his opinion, there is “no
undefined residuum of [executive] power” in the Constitution, and “the
President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably
traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included
within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.”43
Those grants of authority may be made through either the Constitution or
an act of Congress passed in accordance with the Constitution’s
procedural requirements.44

Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
See generally supra text accompanying notes 17–26; note 27 and accompanying text.
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
39 Id.
40 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
41 Id. art. II, § 3.
42 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 357 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1926) (1913).
43 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139–40 (1916).
44 Perhaps a better way of explaining the dichotomy between Roosevelt and Taft would be to
say that Roosevelt saw the Constitution’s articulation of executive power as limiting an inherent,
broad authority of the executive to act, whereas Taft thought executive authority to be limited to
only the powers specifically articulated in the Constitution.
36
37
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Important to the absence of an explicit grant of executive emergency
power in the Constitution is the historical context under which that
compact was conceived. The Constitution was a response to what its
drafters believed to have been the tyranny under which colonial America
had been ruled by its English master. To avoid the confiscation of power
by a single person, the Framers divided authority among three co-equal
parts of government. And, to further protect from tyranny, the Framers
placed responsibility for what arguably are the most serious and
important of powers—namely, the responsibility to make laws,45 the
authority to raise armed forces and declare war,46 and the control of the
treasury47—with the part of government comprised of the largest group
of people: Congress.48
Moreover, although “[t]he Constitution was adopted in a period of
grave emergency,”49 the framers specifically chose not to vest with the
executive with broad power to unilaterally react to exigency, let alone to
the whim or caprice of the moment of the day. 50 In fact, under the
Constitution—or, put differently, under the letter of the bedrock law of
our society—a President’s power is limited to leadership of the armed
forces,51 the granting of pardons,52 the making of appointments,53 and the
responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”54

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–13.
47 See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
48 Compare id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several
States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . .”), and id. art I., § 3, cl. 1 (“The
Senate . . . shall be composed of two Senators from each State . . . .”), with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The
executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .”), and id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power . . .
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish.”).
49 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S 398, 426 (1934).
50 There perhaps is one exception to this rule. Some believe that the Constitution permits the
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in a time of rebellion or invasion,
when required to secure the public safety. See S. JOURNAL, 37th Cong. 1st Sess. 12–13 (1861)
(containing President Lincoln’s remarks in support of the Executive’s ability to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus without congressional authorization). But see Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although this provision does not state that suspension must be
effected by, or authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood, consistent with English
practice and the Clause’s placement in Article I.” (citations omitted)); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144, 151–152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (Taney, C.J.) (rejecting President Lincoln’s suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus on the theory “[t]hat the president, under the constitution of the United
States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, nor authorize a military officer to
do it”). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
52 Id.
53 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
54 Id. art. II, § 3.
45
46
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Nothing in the Constitution allows the executive to take from Congress
the authority to, for example, make laws and control the public purse.
Indeed, the Constitution’s “grants of power were determined . . . in
the light of [the] emergency” during which that document was created,
and “they are not altered by emergency.”55 “Emergency does not create
power,”56 but instead merely “furnish[es] the occasion for the exercise of
power.”57
B.

Statutory Executive Power

Taft’s view of the origins of executive power—that it is derived
from the Constitution and only from the Constitution58—leads to the
alternative source of that authority, namely, an act of Congress. 59
Through the presidencies of Roosevelt and Taft—and, in fact, through
the first three-quarters of the twentieth century—presidential emergency
authority had been a murky proposition. At that point, emergency laws
and procedures were a “disarr[a]y” that had resulted in a majority of
Americans then alive living “their entire lives under emergency rule.” 60
In response to that “dangerous state of affairs,”61 the Senate created
the Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers to review the executive exercise of emergency power.
Through three years of work, the Special Committee recognized that the
haze in which emergency power was applied came about as “a direct
result of Congress’ failure to establish effective means for the handling
of emergencies and its willingness to defer to Executive branch
leadership.”62 During four decades marked by, among other things,
significant wars, “Congress, through its own actions ha[d] transferred
awesome magnitudes of power to the Executive without ever examining

Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934).
Id. at 472 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57 Id. (emphasis added).
58 Supra note 43 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 44.
59 At this point, this Article takes no firm position with respect whether the Constitution vests
the President with authority to declare a national emergency, let alone whether the President has
the constitutional authority to declare a national emergency for the purpose of procuring funding
for a domestic project such as a border wall. For that discussion, see infra Part III.
60 S. COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS & S. SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT’L EMERGENCIES &
DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, 94TH CONG., NAT’L EMERGENCIES ACT SOURCE BOOK 33
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SOURCE BOOK].
61 That “dangerous state of affairs” came to a head as a result of “the United States’ experience
in the Viet Nam War and the incursion into Cambodia,” through which “Americans [were
committed by the President] to warfare without any Congressional declaration of a state of war.”
Id. at 33–34.
62 Id. at 33.
55
56
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the cumulative effect of that delegation of responsibility.” 63 Moreover,
the Special Committee observed, Congress had “tolerated and condoned
Executive initiatives without fulfilling its own constitutional
responsibilities,” including the duty to “in large measure make the law.”64
Based on those considerations, the Special Committee urged the
passage of the National Emergencies Act to “check[] the growth of
Executive power and [to] return[] the United States to normal peacetime
processes.”65 That measure, thought the Special Committee, was “vital”
to “insuring that the United States travel[ed] a road marked by legislative
oversight and carefully constructed legal safeguards.”66
So murky was the state of emergency authority at that time that
Special Committee investigators had only a “rudimentary state of
knowledge of emergency laws and procedures.”67 Quickly, however, the
Special Committee “discovered that disorder enveloped the whole field
of emergency statutes and procedures,”68 and that four national
emergencies—one of which dated to the banking crisis of 1933—
remained in force.69 The standing nature of those states of emergency was
significant because, under then-existing statutes, any declaration of
emergency powers triggered “extraordinary” executive authority that
included the powers to, among other things, detail the armed forces “‘to
assist in military matters’ in any foreign country,” declare any part of the
United States a military zone, and “use the militia or armed forces to
suppress ‘conspiracy.’”70
The Special Committee also reiterated that “our system of
government ‘is a balanced power structure,’” and that “Executive power
to act is a variable” depending on either the President’s independent
powers (drawn from the Constitution) or the will of the people (discerned
from an express or implied authorization of Congress).71 That is, “[t]he
President’s power, if any, . . . must stem either from an act of Congress
or from the Constitution itself.”72
By the early 1970s, Congress realized that it had “allowed the
Executive to usurp” the Constitutional role of the legislative branch in the
emergency realm, and that it was necessary to “reassert the principle that

Id.
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 34.
68 Id. at 35.
69 Id.
70 Id. (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 38 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
72 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585 (majority opinion).
63
64
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emergency powers are available only for brief periods when Congress is
unable to act.”73 In fact, by then it was argued that the gravest—and
paradoxically continuing—national emergency at that time was one that
had “throw[n] our whole system of constitutional government into
jeopardy.”74 That emergency was characterized as “the atrophy of
Congress.”75
So it was that the Special Committee sought “the decisive recovery
of legislative powers”76 through legislation “establish[ing] procedures for
the handling of any future national emergency.”77 On August 22, 1974—
within weeks of President Richard Nixon’s Watergate-fueled
resignation,78 and shortly after the end of American involvement in the
undeclared Vietnam War79—the Special Committee introduced the
National Emergencies Act to the Senate.80 The original bill provided for
the termination of existing executive national emergency powers and
authorities, for “[c]ongressional review of further national emergencies,”
and for “[c]ongressional oversight of and Executive accountability for
actions taken” under the guise of emergency authority. 81 It passed the
Senate in a substantively identical form and without dissent in October
1974.82 Following minor technical amendments, the House of
Representatives and the Senate agreed on a final version of “this
significant piece of legislation” by early 1976 with “universal support.”83
What became the National Emergencies Act84 authorized the President to
See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 60, at 16.
Id. at 17.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 40.
78 The Watergate scandal, of course, arose from the efforts of President Nixon’s administration
to cover up its involvement in a break-in at the Democratic Party Headquarters at the Watergate
office complex in Washington, D.C., in 1972. The attempted cover-up prompted a congressional
investigation that revealed numerous abuses of power by the Nixon administration, which in turn
prompted Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974. See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Resigns, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 1974, at A01, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/
watergate/articles/080974-3.htm [https://perma.cc/DYZ5-7NQF]. The National Emergencies Act
reflected those times and the resulting legislative desire to curb opportunity for expansion and
concomitant abuse of executive powers. See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 60, at 44, 51.
79 That conflict—which included an incursion into Cambodia without Congressional
authorization—and the Watergate “abuses . . . led Congress to assume a more prominent role” in
demanding “increased Executive accountability.” See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 60, at vii, 3.
Congress also sought “to make the Executive accountable for his [or her] actions and to restore
Congress as an equal partner in government” and to “restore the constitutional balance between the
Executive and Legislative branches of [the federal] government.” Id.; see also id. at 14.
80 Id. at 40.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 40–41.
83 Id. at 41–42.
84 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (2012).
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declare a national emergency, but only in circumstances in which such a
declaration had been authorized by Congress.85
II. THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
No matter the result of the Wall debate—that is, irrespective of
whether the national emergency declaration in support of the Wall project
passes legislative and judicial muster—the problem remains that
Congress’s recapture of its delegated authority is now much more
difficult than originally intended. When the National Emergencies Act
was enacted in 1976, a joint resolution of Congress was not subject to a
presidential veto, meaning that if a bare majority of the members of each
House voted to annul a declaration of a national emergency, that
declaration was deemed terminated.
In 1983, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a declaration of
even one House of Congress is subject to a presidential veto when taking
action that is “essentially legislative in purpose and effect.”86 As the logic
went, a resolution exercising power under a statute is a legislative act,
and a legislative act is subject to the Constitution’s procedural
requirements, which afford opportunity for a presidential veto.87
Because Congress may terminate a presidential emergency
declaration only through a joint resolution, and because a joint resolution
in this context is a legislative act, such a resolution necessarily is subject
to a presidential veto. And, although the drafters of the National
Emergencies Act intended for presidential emergency authority to be
85 Id. § 1621. In imagining what became the National Emergencies Act, the Special Committee
“paid close attention to court decisions,” including the Supreme Court’s ruling in Youngstown Steel
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See SOURCE BOOK, supra note 60, at 38. At bottom,
Youngstown stood for the proposition that if there is a statute governing the exercise of Executive
power, then “the Executive is obliged to use th[at] statutory remedy.” SOURCE BOOK, supra note
60, at 24.
The circumstances in which Congress has authorized the exercise of emergency executive
power may generally be grouped into six categories: public health; land management; military and
national defense; the federal workforce; asset seizure, control, and transfer; and international
relations. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS AND THEIR USE 3–
42
(2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legislation/
AGuideToEmergencyPowersAndTheirUse_2.13.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY5U-TSAT]. Of
principal concern to the Wall issue is the “military and national defense” category, wherein
Congress has conferred upon the President the power to, among other things, authorize military
construction projects “necessary to support [emergency] use of the armed forces.” See 10 U.S.C.
§ 2808(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2017); see also Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the
Southern Border of the United States, Proclamation 9844, 84 Fed. Reg. 4949 (Feb. 15, 2019)
(invoking 10 U.S.C. § 2808(a) in conjunction with the President’s national emergency declaration).
Again, though, neither the merits nor the legality of the Wall issue is considered by this Article.
86 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).
87 See id. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3.
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authorized only upon the consent of a majority of members of each House
of Congress, the evolution of the law since the Act’s enactment has
yielded a bizarre situation in which Congress likely must override a
presidential veto to retain legislative authority and constrain a President’s
use of emergency powers. That is, while the National Emergencies Act
was intended to authorize emergency executive action only upon the
approval of a majority of members of each House of Congress, it now
permits emergency executive action without the disapproval of twothirds of the members of each such House.88
Regardless of the outcome of the Wall controversy, the means by
which Congress authorizes executive retention of the legislative authority
it has delegated on the basis of a national emergency declaration is
something Congress should revisit sooner rather than later. On the one
hand, emergency power is designed to address fluid, emergent, acute, and
unexpected situations.89 To suggest that (potentially lethargic)
congressional approval is required to legitimately react to such
Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952.
Congress did not define “national emergency,” but that approach was almost certainly
intentional. That is because to define a national emergency would be to limit the desired flexibility
and further constrain presidential emergency power already cabined through the National
Emergencies Act. Historically, a national emergency has been declared in response to an
unexpected, sudden situation. Examples of this include: blocking trade with Iran shortly after the
U.S. embassy in that country was invaded; prohibiting transactions with Iraq immediately after its
invasion of Kuwait; responding to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; and addressing an
influenza epidemic. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DECLARED NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
UNDER THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, 1978–2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/analysis/NEA%20Declarations.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6CF-TGYR] (last visited Mar.
21, 2019).
In any event, there are strong hints as to the characteristics that a true national emergency
might have. For example, the Supreme Court has suggested, but not explicitly stated, that an
“emergency” is an unforeseeable condition, namely a “disaster” such as “fire, flood, or earthquake.”
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 (1934). The incorporation of urgency
and suddenness in this definition of an emergency is logical, given the Court’s broader view of
emergency powers. “Emergency,” the Court observed, “does not create power . . . or remove or
diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved.” Id. at 425. Rather, the Court
reasoned, “emergency [merely] afford[s] a reason for the exertion of a living power already
enjoyed.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917)).
The Court is not alone in its view that an “emergency” must be abrupt. Dictionaries, of
course, serve as reference sources for English and other languages, and for that reason courts have
deemed dictionary definitions to be useful guides in determining the meaning of statutory language.
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 (1994). At least one
dictionary current at the time the National Emergencies Act became law characterized an
“emergency” as “an unforeseen combination of circumstances or resulting state that calls for
immediate action.” Emergency, WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 372 (1974).
Consequently, at least one scholar has written to Congress explaining an emergency situation has
at least three aspects: (1) a “temporal character,” inasmuch as its nature is “sudden, unforeseen, and
of unknown duration”; (2) “dangerous and threatening to life and well-being”; and (3)
circumstances requiring “immediate action.” HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98505 GOV, NATIONAL EMERGENCY POWERS 4 (2007).
88
89
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circumstances would arguably be at odds with the purpose of conferring
emergency powers.
On the other hand, the opportunity for the abuse of such powers
grew quietly, but dramatically, since the National Emergencies Act was
passed, and Congress should revisit the mechanism by which it confers
such power.90 This is perhaps one of the most dangerous aspects of any
national emergency declaration: congressional oversight of a President’s
exercise of what are essentially legislative powers—authority delegated
to the executive branch by act of Congress—becomes controlled by a
critical mass of the minority in each House. Support not from a majority
of each House, but from only one-third-plus-one member of each such
body, essentially allows the Chief Executive to wield legislative power
that was effectively delegated by less than a majority of each House of
Congress.
III. THE REPAIR
In its current form, the National Emergencies Act delegates power
upon request of the executive branch unless and until Congress—subject,
incredibly, to a presidential veto91—affirmatively reclaims that authority.
This arrangement—in which power is transferred unless Congress acts to
recover it—is similar to what this Article will call “punt” laws.
To punt, of course, is to abdicate control. Accordingly, a punt law is
one in which the enacting legislative body essentially seeks to disclaim
responsibility for actions taken under authority conferred by that body.
There generally are two instances where a legislative body wishes not to
be responsible for the authority that it has delegated.
The first frequently occurs in the context of pay raises for elected
officials. Supporting a salary increase is dangerous business for any
politician of ambition, and such raises sometimes are based on a
recommendation by an independent body tasked by a legislature with
evaluating lawmaker compensation and offering a proposals for adjusting
it. The terms of the legislation creating that body typically provide that
the recommendation of the independent body takes effect unless modified
or abrogated by the subject legislature.92 This structure affords legislators
90 Perhaps one way to revisit that issue would be to include an opportunity for congressional
affirmation. That is, Congress may wish to continue to endow the executive with authority to
quickly react to emergency situations, but provide such a delegation expires absent the approval of
a majority of the members of Congress within a relatively short time period (for example, two
weeks or one month).
91 Supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
92 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 13, 2015, 2015 N.Y. Laws, ch. 60, Part E; see also N.Y. STATE
COMM’N ON LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, & EXEC. COMP., nyscommissiononcompensation.org
[https://perma.cc/UFZ3-ADJ9] (last updated Nov. 17, 2016).
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political cover for any pay raise the independent body recommends. That
is, they are free to disavow responsibility for that wage growth because
they are relieved of the burden of voting in favor of the recommended the
salary increase.
The second common instance of a legislative punt involves policy
determinations where the legislature lacks either the expertise or the
interest to reach such decisions on its own. The separation of powers
doctrine permits a legislature broad leeway in delegating its regulatory
authority to an executive agency in administering the law enacted by that
legislature.93 An agency may be clothed with powers expressly and
impliedly conferred by an enabling statute passed by a legislature, but
that agency may not adopt regulations or rules that go beyond the
boundaries of the enabling legislation.94 Said differently, an agency may
enact rules and regulations consistent with the parameters of the
legislation authorizing it to act, so as to relieve the legislature from the
responsibility of making rules it may have neither the time nor the
expertise to create.
The National Emergencies Act is not reflective of such a punt.
Congress initially sought to retain control of the authority it conferred
upon the executive branch through a simple-majority vote.95 But, as
noted, the necessary threshold to reclaim that power changed
dramatically in 1983 when the Supreme Court’s decision effectively
allowed the President to veto a joint resolution terminating a national
emergency.96 The question now is how the legislative branch may
recapture its constitutionally delegated authority from the executive
branch.
A.
1.

The Practical Solution97
50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)

The means by which a national emergency declaration can be
terminated are set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a). In its current form, the
pertinent part of that statute is as follows:

See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014).
See id. at 325–26.
95 See discussion supra Section I.B.
96 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); supra text
accompanying notes 86–88.
97 In this Section of the Article, proposed subtractions from statutes are noted in “strikeout”
text (e.g., subtraction), while proposed additions to statutes are noted in capital letters (e.g.,
ADDITION).
93
94
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(a) Termination methods
Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with
this subchapter shall terminate if—
(1) there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating the
emergency; or
(2) the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency.98

Absent a presidential termination of a national emergency, Congress
may revoke such a declaration only if it enacts a joint resolution
terminating that emergency. Now, unlike when § 1622 was enacted, that
joint resolution is subject to defeat by a presidential veto.99 Accordingly,
in its present shape, congressional termination of a national emergency
declaration requires a veto-proof, two-thirds supermajority100—far in
excess of the simple majority Congress envisioned when it provided for
its powers to be delegated.
The simplest solution is to modify the National Emergencies Act
such that a presidential declaration of a national emergency is not selfexecuting and essentially effective until Congress defeats the declaration,
but self-defeating and, following a short grace period, essentially
ineffective until Congress approves of it. That is, to protect the
legislature’s grip on its own constitutional authority, the relevant parts of
§ 1622(a) should provide as follows:
(a) Termination method
Any national emergency declared by the President in accordance with
this subchapter shall terminate if—
(1) UNLESS there is enacted into law a joint resolution terminating
EXTENDING the emergency WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THAT
DELCARATION; or
(2) IF the President issues a proclamation terminating the emergency;
OR
(3) IMMEDIATELY, IF THE PRESIDENT, OR A PRIOR SITTING
PRESIDENT, PREVIOUSLY DECLARED AN IDENTICAL OR
SUBSTANTIVELY SIMILAR NATIONAL EMERGENCY
WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE MAKING OF THE INSTANT
NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARATION.101

50 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (2012).
See supra text accompanying notes 95–96.
100 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 3.
101 A paraphrase of a decades-old observation is appropriate here: “I shall not today attempt to
further define” the phrase “substantively similar” as it is used in these proposed revisions to the
National Emergencies Act. “[P]erhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so,” but I suppose
98
99
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These proposed modifications—which surely could be refined by those
skilled art of drafting legislation—target two significant points.
First, the modifications proposed to subsection (1) automatically
terminate a national emergency following a short grace period (in this
proposal, thirty days) designed to permit Congress a reasonable amount
of time to gather, to debate the declaration, and to act on the declaration.
The thirty-day period is recommended to balance the need to allow
Congress a sufficient time to gather in the event a large-scale catastrophe
or cataclysmic event with the necessity of limiting unchecked executive
taking of legislative power.
Second, and just as important (and, perhaps, inartfully), the
proposed addition of subsection (3) is designed to prevent executive
“shenanigans” to create a “backdoor” national emergency. Even with the
automatic termination of a national emergency absent Congressional
action extending that emergency, an executive theoretically could
frustrate legislative constraint of emergency authority by repeatedly “redeclaring” the same national emergency following legislative abrogation
of an emergency declaration. The proposed section (3) reflects an attempt
to proactively eliminate the “re-declaration” option by preventing the
President from subverting legislative rejection of an emergency
declaration by simply and repeatedly “re-declaring” that same
emergency.
2.

50 U.S.C. § 1622(b)

Concomitant with those changes, Congress should also modify
subdivision (b) of 50 U.S.C. § 1622, which requires periodic
Congressional review of a national emergency declaration. At present,
that subsection provides:
Not later than six months after a national emergency is declared, and
not later than the end of each six-month period thereafter that such
emergency continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider
a vote on a joint resolution to determine whether that emergency shall
be terminated.102

Said more simply, § 1622(b) in its current form demands that
Congress consider the propriety of a national emergency declaration no
later than six months after that declaration is made. So long as that
national emergency continues, Congress also must revisit that declaration
and the end of every six-month period following its initial review.
that the courts—and Congress and the public—will “know it when [they] see it.” Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (struggling to define what is “obscene”).
102 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) (2012).
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To the extent § 1622(a) is updated to attach a fast-acting “poison
pill” or a short-term automatic sunset to any national emergency
declaration, § 1622(b) should be changed to account for those
modifications. Whereas that statute now provides that Congress must
meet to consider whether to terminate a national emergency declaration
no later than six months after that declaration is made, § 1622(b) should
be changed to reflect that Congress must meet to consider whether an
existing national emergency should be terminated every six months after
extending a national emergency declaration through a joint resolution.
Accordingly, § 1622(b) should be changed to read as follows:
Not later than six months after a national emergency is declared
EXTENDED BY JOINT RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS, and not
later than the end of each six-month period thereafter that such
emergency continues, each House of Congress shall meet to consider
a vote on a joint resolution to determine whether that emergency shall
be terminated.103

3.

50 U.S.C. § 1601

Finally, consistent with Congress’s approach in 1976, any changes
to the National Emergencies Act should be accompanied by a provision
terminating all existing national emergencies. In enacting the National
Emergency Act, Congress terminated all existing emergencies through
§ 1601(a) and § 1601(b), which read:
(a) All powers and authorities possessed by the President, any other
officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any executive
agency, as defined in section 105 of title 5, as a result of the existence
of any declaration of national emergency in effect on September 14,
1976, are terminated two years from September 14, 1976. Such
termination shall not affect—
(1) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or
determined on such date;
(2) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such
date; or
(3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred
prior to such date.

103 Notably, this Article suggests no changes to the automatic termination provision of
§ 1622(d). Pursuant to that subsection, any declared national emergency “shall terminate on the
anniversary of the declaration of that emergency if, within the ninety-day period prior to each
anniversary date, the President does not publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress
a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect after such anniversary.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1622(d) (2012).
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(b) For the purpose of this section, the words “any national emergency
in effect” means a general declaration of emergency made by the
President.104

The changes that should be made to § 1601 are simple. They would
essentially reflect updates to the Act’s global “sunset” provision, and a
short grace period in which existing emergency declarations could be
reiterated. Those changes could take the following form:
(a) All powers and authorities possessed by the President, any other
officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any executive
agency, as defined in section 105 of title 5, as a result of the existence
of any declaration of national emergency in effect on September 14,
1976 JULY 4, 2019, are terminated two years THREE MONTHS from
September 14, 1976 JULY 4, 2019. Such termination shall not
affect—
(1) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or
determined on such date;
(2) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such
date; or
(3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred
prior to such date.
(b) For the purpose of this section, the words “any national emergency
in effect” means a general declaration of emergency made by the
President.105

B.

The Practical Problem with the Practical Solution

As pragmatic as the foregoing solution may be, it is not a perfect
salve for the national emergency issue. The practical problem with that
practical approach is of a political nature. At present, there is tension both
within Congress,106 and between Congress—which, at least in theory,
50 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012).
The date July 4, 2019, is arbitrary, and is merely a placeholder for a date that would be chosen
by Congress. The narrower grace period recommended herein—three months, as opposed to two
years—is somewhat less arbitrary. The shortened time period before an existing emergency
declaration terminates is designed to wipe the slate of standing emergencies clean as quickly as is
reasonably possible, while at the same time affording the President a reasonable opportunity to
determine which, if any, emergency declarations should be renewed following the amendment of
the National Emergencies Act.
106 The Democratic Party holds a majority of seats in the House of Representatives, while the
Republican Party holds a majority of seats in the Senate. See U.S. House Election Results 2018,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/
elections/results-house-elections.html [https://perma.cc/WG7X-78WC]; U.S. Senate Election
Results 2018, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 10:38 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/
11/06/us/elections/results-senate-elections.html [https://perma.cc/CU35-5XHY].
104
105
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should wish to cabin the emergency authority delegated to the executive
branch—and the President—who has used the cloak of emergency power
to secure funding for his core campaign promise of the Wall.107
It may well be that Congress will struggle to agree upon a proposal
to change the National Emergencies Act to retain legislative power.
Democrats in the House would probably prefer to eliminate all standing
national emergencies—consistent with legislative actions in 1976108—
and start with a clean slate that delegates legislative power based on
Congressional approval of a national emergency, rather than on the
cobbling together of a supermajority to disapprove of a presidential veto.
By contrast, it is likely that Republicans in the Senate ultimately prefer
to modify the National Emergencies Act only prospectively, so as to
allow President Trump to proceed with his means of funding border wall
construction.109
107 See H.R. DOC. NO. 116-22 (containing President Trump’s veto message concerning the
“joint resolution that would terminate the national emergency [he] declared regarding the crisis on
our southern border”).
108 See generally discussion supra Section IV.A.3.
109 Indeed, as this Article was under construction, fifteen Republican Senators introduced
legislation proposing amendments to the National Emergencies Act that, in some respects, are
consistent with those recommended herein. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Mike Lee, Sen. Lee
Introduces ARTICLE ONE Act to Reclaim Congressional Power (Mar. 12, 2019), https://
www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/3/sen-lee-introduces-article-one-act-to-reclaimcongressional-power [https://perma.cc/YP3C-TKG4]. The bill contains some sound elements. For
example, similar to the suggestions here, it provides for the automatic termination of a national
emergency in the absence of congressional approval. ARTICLE ONE Act, S. 764, 116th Cong. sec.
2, § 201(c)(1) (as introduced, Mar. 12, 2019). The bill further smartly provides for a temporary
exception to that automatic termination clause “[i]f Congress is physically unable to convene as a
result of an armed attack upon the United States or another national emergency.” Id. § 201(c)(3).
In addition to enhancing presidential reporting requirements, see id. sec. 5, § 401(d), and
confirming that approval of a national emergency declaration does not alter the proposed new
national emergency review framework, id. sec. 4, § 203(a)(2)(G), the bill also ensures consideration
of a national emergency action without the “haze” of additional issues, inasmuch as it prohibits
amendments—and therefore the review of questions unrelated to the debate over the declared
emergency—to the joint resolution, see id. § 203(a)(2)(D) (outlining the rules for consideration in
the Senate); id. § 203(a)(2)(E) (outlining the rules for consideration in the House of
Representatives).
The problems with the ARTICLE ONE Act, or the Lee Bill, however, are at least threefold,
and are so significant as to likely doom passage of that measure in the Democrat-controlled House
of Representatives. First, dissimilar to the approach Congress took in 1976, the Lee Bill does not
provide for the termination of all existing national emergencies. To that end, Senator Lee’s
approach arguably is an odd one: he acknowledges the problem with respect to executive usurpation
of legislative power, but does not address what some would characterize as the executive abuse that
prompted his proposed amendments to the National Emergencies Act.
Second, the Lee Bill does not figuratively “lock” the “backdoor,” as recommended herein.
See generally discussion supra Section IV.A.1. That is, Senator Lee does not account for the
possibility that an executive may create a series of “backdoor” national emergencies to circumvent
congressional non-approval of such unilateral executive action. Even if Congress modifies the
National Emergencies Act to automatically terminate a national emergency in the absence of
congressional approval therefor, the Lee Bill leaves open the possibility that an executive may
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Whether right or wrong, external factors surely will influence the
calculation of whether to support a congressional effort to recapture
legislative power. Assuming the unwillingness of President Trump to
sign a law that defeats his ability to fund the Wall without congressional
approval,110 what should be a bipartisan effort to recapture legislative
power for the legislative branch will turn on the agreement of a
supermajority of members of each House sufficient to override a
presidential veto. The assembly of that majority is far from guaranteed.
The joint resolution to terminate the subject national emergency
declaration passed the Senate by a 59-41 vote, and the House by a 245182 tally—eight votes short of the sixty-seven required for the
supermajority needed to override a veto in the Senate, and forty-five votes
shy of a supermajority in the House. Given the obvious political
considerations attached to the Wall question, and given that the national
emergency declaration is the only tool now available to secure Wall
funding over the objection of a divided Congress, those supermajorities
seem to be unlikely propositions.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer111—one of the seminal cases on the extent of executive power—
was accompanied by a concurring opinion by Justice Robert Jackson that
perhaps is even more prescient now than it was then. Justice Jackson, of
course, served as United States Solicitor General, United States Attorney
repeatedly declare the same national emergency, thereby requiring Congress to repeatedly act to
thwart executive usurpation of legislative authority. That scenario is particularly concerning in the
event of a national emergency declaration made during a period of congressional recess; as the Lee
Bill acknowledges, in such a scenario, it may be that Congress could not immediately act to defeat
a presidential declaration of a national emergency unless the President convened Congress. See
S. 764, sec. 4, § 203(a)(2)(B).
Third, the Lee Bill does not provide for the termination of any contracts for construction
executed pursuant to the President’s emergency authority if such construction has commenced
before the termination date of the subject national emergency. See id. sec. 3, § 202(b)(1)(C).
Consequently, under the Lee Bill, a fast-acting President may contract for the erection of structures
she believes address a declared national emergency—for example, a border wall addressing what
President Trump believes to be a present-day national emergency pertaining to illegal immigration,
or a series of “green energy” production devices a future president may believe addresses a national
emergency pertaining to climate change. Accordingly, under the Lee Bill, so long as work pursuant
to those construction contracts begins before Congress can stop it, such contracts cannot be
terminated, and the “emergency” construction ultimately rejected by Congress may be allowed to
continue.
110 See Tim Lau, Trump Vetoes After Congress Rejects Border Emergency, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/senate-rejects-trump-emergencydeclaration-border-wall [https://perma.cc/EK9S-W6PU].
111 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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General, the Chief United States Prosecutor at the Nuremburg Trials in
1945 and 1946, and as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court.112 These roles gave him a unique combination of experiences at
the highest levels in United States government and with the depths of
tyranny that was Nazi Germany.
His concurrence in Youngstown began with a warning:
“comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical
advantages and grave dangers for the country.” 113 “The tendency” with
such powers, Justice Jackson noted, “is strong to emphasize transient
results upon policies . . . and lose sight of enduring consequences upon
the balanced power structure of our Republic.”114
Indeed, “the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty,”115 likely as a result of the forefathers’ experience with “the
prerogative exercised by George III,”116 and Jackson thought it unlikely
that the Framers of the Constitution “were creating their new Executive
in his image.”117 The Constitution’s grant of the “title Commander-inChief of the Army and Navy” to the President did not concomitantly
“constitute him also Commander-in-Chief of the country . . . and its
inhabitants.”118 And, Jackson suggested, “emergency powers are
consistent with free government only when their control is lodged
elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them.”119
At bottom, any dispute with respect executive usurpation of
legislative authority goes to “[t]he essence of our free Government,”
which Justice Jackson aptly described as “leave to live by no man’s leave,
underneath the law.”120 That is, we are “to be government by those
impersonal forces which we call law.”121 Nobody was better positioned
than Justice Jackson to recognize that the best—and perhaps only—
”technique for long preserving free government” is to ensure “that the
law be made by parliamentary deliberations,” and “that the Executive be
under the law.”122
112 See Robert H. Jackson, 1941–1954, SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://
supremecourthistory.org/timeline_robertjackson1941-1945.html [https://perma.cc/6LA4-Q7H4]
(last visited May 17, 2019); see also Nuremberg Trial, International Military Tribunal, 1945–1946,
ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR., https://www.roberthjackson.org/nuremberg-timeline [https://perma.cc/
93GC-Z7MU] (last visited May 17, 2019).
113 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 635.
116 Id. at 641.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 643–44.
119 Id. at 652.
120 Id. at 654.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 655.
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Misappropriation of the “law” historically has enabled and fueled
despotism, including Nazi Germany, with which Justice Jackson became
all too familiar. No matter one’s view of the Wall debate, it is nearly
impossible to dispute that the President’s controversial declaration of a
national emergency with respect to the situation on the southern border
has brought to light an inherent, significant problem with the National
Emergencies Act: legislative power is easily delegated to the executive
branch, but not easily recovered from it. That unintended consequence is
one that invites abuse and threatens democracy. Hopefully it is one that,
somehow and someday soon, will be the subject of meaningful and
effective bipartisan reform.

